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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JURISDICTION OF CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD IN ANTITRUST CONTROVERSIES
EXTENDED BY THE SUPREME COURT
A BASIC PROBLEM Of federal adminstrative law has been the con-
flict between administrative regulation of industry and the federal
antitrust laws. In an attempt to avoid this conflict Congress has
sometimes enacted legislative exemptions,1 whereby certain prac-
tices are exempted from the antitrust laws by the regulatory statute
and thus are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. How-
ever, in a number of instances the statutes involved have not been
so specific and the courts have been faced with the problem of
accommodating the regulatory scheme and the antitrust laws. The
principal means of accommodation has been the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, 2 under which a court refrains from exercising its juris-
diction over antitrust matters until the agency involved has deter-
mined those questions within its competency.3 The traditional
' See generally Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and
Procedural Coordination, 58 CoLum. L. Rxv. 673, 679-80 & n.56, 681 (1958). An
example of such an exemption from the antitrust laws is § 414 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1004 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 72
Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958)). An agency ruling under such a statute is subject
to judicial review. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009 (1958). Most of the exemptions from the antitrust laws are worded so that
they will be effective only if the practice has been approved by the agency. Yet,
even in instances where unapproved practices were attacked the courts have sent the
cases to the agency to see whether the agency would approve the practice. See, e.g.,
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); FULDA, COMPETrTION IN
THz REGULATED INDUSTRIEs: TRANSPORTATION § 13.4 (1961) [hereinafter cited as FuLaA];
Note, 58 COLJM. L. RMv. 673, 681 (1958).
a See generally 3 DAViS, ADMINIsRATvE LAW TREATIsF ch. 19 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvIs]; FuLDA § 13; Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Ra-
tionalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 (1956); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered-The
Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954); Latta, Primary Jurisdiction in the
Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws, 30 U. CINc. L. REv. 261 (1961); Schwartz,
Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Ju-
dicial Responsibility, 67 HRv. L. REv. 436 (1954); von Mehren, The Anti-trust Laws
and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARV. L. REV.
929 (1954); Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 673 (1958).
83 DAVIS § 19.01. In the usual situation there is a concurrence of jurisdiction. If
the case is first brought into the courts, the defendant will often raise the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction as a defense. If the courts defer to the primary jurisdiction
of the agency, then the agency will first hear the case. This does not mean that the
agency ruling is conclusive. For one thing, there is a right to judicial review of the
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reasons for invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were: an
attempt to achieve uniformity of regulation4 and deference to the
alleged expertise of the agency.5 A somewhat different ground for
referring a case to an agency is supersession, whereby the courts
determine by statutory construction that the regulatory statute has
superseded the antitrust laws.6 Since the antitrust laws have been
superseded, the case is referred to the agency for determination under
its standards subject only to judicial review.7 Thus, supersession
is similar in effect to legislative exemption and endows the agency
with not only primary but primary and exclusive jurisdiction over
some antitrust matters.8
In the recent case of Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United
States,9 the United States Supreme Court held that the remedy of
agency ruling. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009
(1958). Furthermore, the courts sometimes merely stay the antitrust proceedings
pending the outcome of the agency proceedings. In such cases, a problem is raised
as to the weight the court will give in its determination of the antitrust case to the
findings, evaluations and determinations made by the agency in its proceeding. See
3 DAvis § 19.07; FULDA § 13.1; Latta, supra note 2, at 267.
'See, e.g., Texas 8= Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). See
generally Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction-What It Is and What It Is Not, 13 A.B.A.
ANTrmUST SEc. RE-P. 26, 26-35 (1958).
5 See, e.g., Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922). See
also FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (expertise as finders and interpreters
of fact); United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (primary juris-
diction based on both uniformity and expertise). See generally Mitchell, supra note 4,
at 26-35. For a criticism of expertise as a criterion for invoking primary jurisdiction
see Schwartz, supra note 2, at 471-75.
6 See Latta, supra note 2, at 266-67; cf. Note, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 673, 681 (1958).
Supersession is effected because of an apparent direct conflict between the regulatory
statute and the antitrust laws. Since the regulatory statute is a more recent and
more specific expression of congressional policy, the antitrust law is held to have been
superseded. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79 (1944)
(statutory exemption case).
For examples of supersession see Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S.
570 (1952) (Federal Maritime Act); United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284
U.S. 474 (1932) (same); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 235
(D.C. Cir. 1951), aFd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952) (Federal Power Commission Act). The
Far East and Cunard cases arose under a section which gave the FMB the authority
to exempt certain practices from the antitrust laws, but in neither case had the ap-
proval of the FMB been sought. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the antitrust laws
had been superseded and the agency should hear the case and determine whether the
practices were proper. Such a ruling does not mean that the policy of the antitrust
laws will not play a part in the agency determination. However, an interesting ques-
tion is to what extent antitrust policy should influence agency decisions. See notes
31-36 infra and accompanying text.
7 See Latta, supra note 2, at 276-77.
"See generally Note, 58 COLUM. L. Rxv. 673, 681 (1958). It should be noted that
in the usual circumstances the immunization from the antitrust laws is broader under
statutory exemption than under supersession.
9 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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the Sherman Act had been superseded by section 411 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act10 (CAA), which invests the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) with power to issue cease and desist orders to protect the
public interest from air carriers who engage in "unfair . . . prac-
tices or unfair methods of competition." Thus, the Court ruled
that under section 411 the CAB had primary and exclusive juris-
diction coupled with a power of divestment over questions of terri-
torial division, route allocations and combinations between common
carriers and air carriers.".
In 1928 Pan American World Airways, Inc., and the steamship
line W. R. Grace & Co. formed, as 50 per cent owners, Pan American
Grace Airways (Panagra). Under this agrecment Panagra was to
operate on the West Coast of South America and Pan American was
to serve the East Coast of South America and north of the Canal
Zone. In 1938 Grace began a move to have Panagra petition the
CAB for a route extension from the Canal Zone to the United States,
but the directors controlled by Pan American refused to agree to
such a petition. Thus, the conflict arose which eventually led to
the Pan American case.' 2 The present suit was instituted by the
10 "The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any air car-
rier,... if it considers that such action by it would be in the interest of the public,
investigate and determine whether any air carrier, . . .has been or is engaged in
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transporta-
tion .... If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier ...
is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it
shall order such air carrier,... to cease and desist from such practices or methods of
competition."
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 411, 52 Stat. 1003, amended by 66 Stat. 628 (1952)
(now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 72 Stat. 769, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958)).
See American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956), which
construes § 411 in a case dealing with infringement of trade name.
21 371 U.S. at 310. The Court qualified its decision by stating that the Board did
not have primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all antitrust issues. Id. at 311-12.
The Court stated that the courts would still handle all criminal violations of the anti-
trust laws. This indicates that § 411 was not given the broad immunization from all
antitrust attacks that § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958), accords transactions approved by
the Board under §§ 408, 409, and 412, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378-79, 1382 (1958). See McManus
v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 866 U.S. 928, rehearing denied, 366
U.S. 978 (1961). Furthermore, the Court did not state whether or not a private party
could bring a civil suit in the courts.
"2Brief for Respondent, pp. 7-19. In 1941 Grace filed a petition with the CAB to
have Panagra's route extended. The Board dismissed on the ground that it could
extend Panagra's route only if Panagra applied for the route extension. Panagra
Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670 (1944). This ruling was reversed by the court
of appeals, which held that the Board could entertain the application filed by Grace
if Pan American's refusal to agree to the petition was based on "illegality or fraud."
W.R. Grace & Co. v. CAB, 154 F.2d 271, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1946). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, 328 U.S. 832 (1946), but later dismissed for mootness, 332 U.S. 827
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Justice Department and charged Pan American, Grace and Panagra
with violations of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act.' 8 The
district court dismissed the charges against Grace and Panagra, but
found Pan American guilty of violating section 2 of the Sherman
Act for excluding competition by use of its negative control position
to prevent Panagra's application for a route extension.'4
On direct appeal the Supreme Court reversed and denied the
district court's jurisdiction over the antitrust issues of this case,
noting that there would be an odd result if territorial divisions and
route allocations which met the public interest standard of section
411 as defined in section 102 were later held by the courts to be anti-
trust violations.'5 The Court circumvented this potential problem by
construing the CAA as giving the CAB the authority to decide the
antitrust issues presented in its disposition of the case. The Court
first concluded that the phrases "unfair practices" and "unfair meth-
ods of competition" used in section 411 were intended to convey a
broader meaning of competition in the context of the GAA than
accorded at common law.' 6 Since under section 411 the CAB was
to deal with unfair practices and competition when "it would be in
(1947) (per curiam), because the dispute had been settled by an agreement satisfactory
to the Board. Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947).
13Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-3, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1958). It
should be noted that the CAB is given the authority to enforce sections of the Clayton
Act. Clayton Act § 21, 72 Stat. 943, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958). For a list of the specific
charges see United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 21-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). It is also interesting to note that the CAB urged the suit, id. at 20
n.2, and had on several occasions expressed its dissatisfaction with the Panagra setup.
See, e.g., New York-Balboa Through Service Proceedings Reopened, 18 C.A.B. 857,
914 (1954).
14 United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 36-46, 54
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). The district court also ordered Pan American to show why its hold-
ings in Panagra should not be divested. Id. at 54. For other conclusions reached by
the district court, see id. at 22-23.
" 371 U.S. at 309. The Court also stated that if the courts intervened "with their
construction of the antitrust laws, two regimes might collide." Id. at 310.
16The Court looked particularly at § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 72
Stat. 1750, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), the acknowledged model for §411, as an aid in
interpreting the scope of this language in §411. American Airlines, Inc. v. North
American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 85, 55 MICH. L. REV. 305 (1956); RIHYNE, CIVIL
AERONAUTics Aar ANNOTATED 146 & n.501 (1939). For a good discussion of these
phrases as used in §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which can easily be
applied to § 411, see 2 ToUtLMN's ANTI-TRusT LAws § 43.1-.30 (1949).
As the dissent pointed out, § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has never
been held to have superseded the antitrust laws. 371 U.S. at 324. See, e.g., FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co,, 205 F. Supp.
94 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Yet, as a practical matter § 5 of the FTCA could not be held to
supersede the antitrust laws because § 5 covers so much of the economy that the result
would be a wholesale repeal of the antitrust laws.
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the interest of the public," the Court looked to section 10217 to see
whether the issues of this case concerned the public interest in air
transportation. The Court determined that the antitrust questions
involved affected this public interest, and in so ruling noted particu-
larly the language of section 102 which concerns "present and future
needs" of air commerce, and "competition to the extent necessary
to assure sound development."' 8  Thus, by holding that the issues
involved affected this public interest and that section 411 was in-
tended to cover a wide range of unfair practices and competition
that affect the public interest in air transportation, the Court de-
termined that the antitrust issues presented came within the scope
of the CAB's authority under section 411.
Essential to the Court's holding were its findings that section 411
gave the CAB jurisdiction over pre-1938 transactions 9 and a power
to order divestments for violations of that section.20 The Court
interpreted the section 411 language "has been or is engaged in
unfair practices" as giving the CAB jurisdiction over pre-1938 trans-
actions.21  Such power was necessary if the act was to be adminis-
tered as a whole, and thereby the CAB was given the authority to
deal with route allocations and territorial divisions that were estab-
lished before 1988. Further and more important, the Court deter-
mined that the cease and desist power of section 411 included a
power to order divestment for violations of that section. The Court
reasoned that Congress having given the CAB jurisdiction over the
issues of this case must also have intended that the Board have
sufficient power to deal with them. This finding of a power of
divestiture was of principal importance for it enabled the remedy of
the CAA to supersede the remedy of the Sherman Act,22 and thereby
1T Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 102, 52 Stat. 980 (now Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958)). This section prescribes the
general duties and aims of the Aviation Act in accordance with the public interest.
For a criticism of public interest standards see Miller, The Public Interest Undefined,
10 J. PuB. L. 184 (1961).
'1 371 U.S. at 308-09.
x' ld. at 302-03, 310-11.
20 Id. at 311-12.
21 Id. at 303, 312. The conclusion that the CAB had power to deal with pre-1938
transactions under § 411 rejects the contrary position taken in Slick Airways v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 211 (D.N.J. 1951), petition denied, 204 F.2d 230
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
22 1d. at 313 n.19. The fact that the CAB had a power of divestment serves to
answer the argument that the Board should not hear the case because it lacked power
to grant the relief requested or needed. See Slick Airways v. American Airlines, Inc.,
note 21 supra, at 211; Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Ex-
haustion of Litigants, 41 GEo. LJ. 495 (1953). The power of divestment should
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solidified the Court's determination that the Board had primary
and exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the antitrust issues of this
and similar cases. 23
The dissenters argued that such construction violates the rule
against repeals by implication.24 They contended that the Board
not only lacked exclusive jurisdiction but was not even intended to
have the authority to handle the antitrust problems presented. The
dissenters noted that transactions approved by the Board under three
sections of the CAA were given expresss statutory exemption from the
antitrust laws 25 but that no such exemption was accorded transactions
approved under section 411. Also noting several lower court de-
cisions that had rejected a supersession argument,26 the dissenters
reasoned that section 411 was not repugnant to the antitrust laws
and therefore there was no basis for a pro tanto repeal of those
laws.27 The argument of the dissenters indicates that they place pri-
also prevent cases where the claimant effectively is left without a forum. See, e.g.,
Seatrain Lines v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 916
(1953). For a discussion of this judicial vacuum see Convisser, supra note 2, at 332-35.
23It seems implicit in the Court's decision that any transaction attacked under
§411 which the CAB approves must be granted immunity from similar attack under
the Sherman Act in the courts. See note 11 supra. Compare the Pan American case
with United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959). In the latter case,
an agency ruling that a certain transaction did not violate the antitrust laws was held
not to immunize the parties from a similar antitrust attack in the courts. A distin.
guishing factor is that the FCC does not have the authority to determine antitrust
issues as such. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
24 371 U.S. at 319-23. It is a general rule of construction that statutes are to be
repealed by implication only in instances of clear repugnancy and only to the extent
of the repugnancy. See, e.g., California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 455-57 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S.
188, 197-206 (1939).
2- Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 414, 52 Stat. 1004 (now Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, as amended, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958)). See note 11 supra.
20 371 U.S. at 323-24. For lower court cases construing § 411 see, e.g., S.S.W., Inc.
v. Air Trans. Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952) (CAB
had primary jurisdiction, but district court retained jurisdiction for injunctive relief
and damages); Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Trans. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp.
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (same); Slick Airways v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199
(D.N.J. 1951), petition denied, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953)
(holding district court should hear entire case). In each of these cases the central
problem dealt with was treble damages and in each the court held that the antitrust
remedy had not been superseded by the CAA.
.27 371 U.S. at 319-24. The dissenters further objected to the fact that the Board
did not have jurisdiction over Grace. Since Grace was a shipping line, they doubted
that it fell within the classification of an "air carrier," necessary to come under § 411.
Thus, the CAB could not adequately deal with the unhealthy situation at hand. Id.
at 328-29. Although the Court did not rule that the CAB had jurisdiction over Grace,
the broad language of the opinion indicates that such jurisdiction was envisioned. Id.
at 311-12.
It is possible that the Board could deal with Grace in a manner that was not
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mary importance on the principles of competition in the belief that
the antitrust laws should be repealed only by express instruction of
Congress.2  As a means of accommodation it was suggested that en-
forcement of the Sherman Act in the courts would settle the problems
of Panagra's control and open the way for action by the CAB on serv-
ice routes to Latin America.
2 9
Although the Court held that the remedy of the antitrust laws
had been superseded by section 411, it did not state the extent to
which, if any, the substantive policy and rationale of the antitrust
laws had been superseded. Such a question could arise only on
judicial review of an agency ruling.30 Upon such review, a court
will determine whether the agency has applied the correct statutory
standards. In the past differences of opinion have arisen as to the
role to be given to antitrust policies in giving content to the con-
gressionally enunciated public interest standard 31 Two possible
approaches to this problem were illustrated in the case of McLean
Trucking Co. v. United States.32  There the majority held that to
suggested. Grace would normally ,fall under § 408, 52 Stat. 1001 (1938) (now Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1958)), but the CAB
has disclaimed jurisdiction under § 408 of pre-1938 formations. Railroad Control of
Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379, 386 (1943). Yet, the CAB has also stated that if
the pre-1938 control position of a non-air carrier were substantially enhanced after
1938, the CAB could deal with the formation. See Pan American-Panagra Agreement,
8 C.A.B. 50, 56 (1947). Thus it would seem that if Pan American were divested of
its holdings in Panagra by either the courts or the CAB, Grace's control position would
be substantially enhanced and the Board could deal with Grace under § 408.
28 371 U.S. at 322-24. See Schwartz, supra note 2, who supports a primacy of the
antitrust laws position. See also Jaffe, supra note 2. It has also been argued that
the courts can better envision the entire economy and are not limited to one industry
as are the agencies. See Latta, supra note 2, at 294.
The dissenters also argued- that a practical effect of the Court's decision is the
probable extension of an already lengthy litigation. 371 U.S. at 327-28. See note 38
infra; see generally FULDA §§ 13.4-.6.
20 371 U.S. at 330. As an alternate means of decision the dissenters suggested that
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction be invoked. Id. at 331-33. Since the dissenters
contended that there was no basis for supersession, it seems apparent that they
envisioned the Board as a mere fact-finding organ in this case. See FMB v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). As the dissent admitted, this means of accommodation would
not achieve any practical results, for the Board's position is already known. 371 U.S. at
332.
20 Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009
(1958); see Latta, supra note 2, at 267.
"'See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); FULDA § 1. See
also Norfolk So. Bus Corp. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 756, 761 (E.D. Va.), afld per
curiam, 340 U.S. 802 (1950) (commission to determine what practices within the public
interest); compare ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTrrRusT REP. 269-70 (1955) (antitrust
should play a larger role).
22321 U.S. 67 (1944). The McLean case reviewed a consolidation of motor carriers
approved by the ICC under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 63 Stat. 485 (1949),
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force the agency to give substantial application to antitrust policy
under its public interest standard would render the exemption from
the antitrust laws useless.33 Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of the
present majority opinion, dissented on the ground that while the
agency was not to be held to strict antitrust standards, a proper
holding would give greater weight to the principles of competition
and that only in cases of clear necessity should the substantive anti-
trust philosophy give way entirely.34 The Court in the Pan Ameri-
can case made several specific references to the use of the word "com-
petition" in section 102 and also stated that the CAA was intended
to enhance antitrust enforcement, not negate it.85 Thus, it would
seem that the Court intended for the CAB to consider substantive
antitrust philosophy in its public interest standard in the manner
urged by Justice Douglas in the McLean case when deciding cases
that come within its primary and exclusive jurisdiction under sec-
tion 411.31
The Court's construction of section 411 (as giving the CAB
primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the antitrust issues of the
instant case) should produce several effects. The principal effect
should be the achieving of uniformity of regulation by a supposedly
expert Board. The Court asserted that such an effect was desirable
because it would enable the CAB to handle issues that have "a par-
ticular relation" to the regulation of the aviation industry37 An-
49 U.S.C. §5 (1958), which grants an exemption from the antitrust laws if the ICC
approves. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (11) (1958) (reasonable and consistent with the public in-
terest). For a general discussion of the McLean case see FULWA § 5.24.
33 321 U.S. at 84-87.
31 Id. at 92-94.
35 371 U.S. at 307. It should be noted that the CAA is unique in that it places
more emphasis on competition than the other federal transportation statutes. See
FOLDA §§ 2.6-.7, 14.2.
" See FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), where the Court ruled that
dual rate systems approved by the FMB under § 14 of the Federal Maritime Act, 39
Stat. 733 (1916) (now 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1958)), were illegal per se, even though the
Court had in Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); and United
States v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), held that § 14 of the FMA had super.
seded the antitrust laws. Thus, although the FMB had exclusive jurisdiction the Court
retained the power to determine the applicability of the statute. For a discussion of
the Isbrandtsen case see FULDA § 10.2; see generally Comment, Primary Jurisdiction
and the Applicability of Antitrust Remedies in the Shipping Industry, 26 U. Cui. L.
Rlv. 598 (1959).
The Pan American case presents an even stronger case for retention of judicial
powers because § 14 of the FMA had an express provision giving approved transactions
immunity from the antitrust laws and no such provision can be found for § 411.
37371 U.S. at 311. For a criticism of regulatory agencies, particularly the CAB,
see Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960); see also, Schwartz, supra note 2, at 436-38, 471-75.
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other apparent effect of the decision should be that the CAB will
be required to take cognizance of antitrust policy when deciding
cases under section 411. Moreover, a practical effect of the Court's
interpretation could be the prevention of divestments that would
prove costly to the airline involved, since the CAB can approve
transactions as being in the public interest even though they are
technical violations of the Sherman Act.
Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has generally been
accepted as necessary for accommodating the regulatory statutes and
the antitrust laws, its application by the courts has been criticized as
time consuming,38 as being mechanically applied,39 and as an abdica-
tion of judicial responsibility.40 Even though the decision in the Pan
American case can be so criticized, the Court is not likely to change
its position and the Congress has shown little willingness to react to
such decisions.41 Moreover, while this decision ostensibly points
toward greater power for administrative agencies, it should not be
assumed that the Court ignored past criticism. Both the majority
and the dissent properly characterized the problem as one of statu-
"
8The time consumed by agency-court-agency and court-agency-court cases has
bothered the commentators. They are particularly critical of the Cunard, Far East,
Isbrandtsen series of cases which took twenty-five years to decide a point that could
have been settled when the Cunard case was first heard, i.e., that dual rate systems
are per se illegal under the Federal Maritime Act. See note 36 supra. See generally
FuUA §§ 13.4-.6, and Latta, supra note 2, at 295.20 Jaffe, supra note 2, at 589-91.
,0 See Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436 (1954). Professor Davis
has argued that Professor Schwartz's attack is misdirected because primary jurisdiction
merely helps courts to determine if they should act with or without the benefit of the
agency; rather, Davis argues that the difficulty lies with the possible lack of judicial
review. 3 DAvis § 19.05. Another commentator has pointed out that while much of
Schwartz's criticism may be valid, Congress has seemingly acquiesced by its prolonged
silence. Latta, supra note 2, at 287.
For general criticisms of the administrative process see STAFF OF SENATE CoA1mq. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D. SEss., REP. ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PR.SI-
DENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960); Hanslowe, The Malaise of the Administrative Process,
1962 DUKE L.J. 477; Hector, supra note 37.
"After Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), in which it was held
that the Interstate Commerce Act was no bar to enjoining a carrier for antitrust viola-
tions, Congress passed the Reid-Bulwinkle Act, 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (b)
(1958), which gave immunity from antitrust attack to similar practices if approved by
the ICC. After FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), in which the Supreme
Court declared a dual rate system per se illegal under the Shipping Act, Congress
amended the Shipping Act to give the FMB power to approve dual rate systems. 72
Stat. 574, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1958); see FULDA §§ 10.3-.4.
Congressman Celler introduced a bill three times, yet to be enacted, which pro-
vides that unless the statute expressly provides otherwise, antitrust suits will not be
barred or stayed for any reason. See FULDA § 13.4.
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tory construction.42  This approach is sounder than mere deference
to expertise and uniformity43 and if followed, should lead to more
satisfactory accommodation of the two regimes and better applica-
tion of the congressional purpose.44 Furthermore, if the courts will
require the CAB to display sufficient cognizance of substantive anti-
trust policy when applying its standards, as the Court indicated it
would, then the traditional principles of competition will play an
important role in the regulation of the aviation industry.*
2 See California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962), where the Court held that the Federal
Power Commission could not proceed on a merger application until an antitrust suit
concerning the same merger had been handled in the courts. Although this decision
appears to conflict with the Pan American case, it was in fact an attempt to handle
accommodation of the two regimes by proper statutory construction. See, BNA, ANT-
fausT & TRADE REGULATION REPORT No. 87, p. B1-B4 (March 12, 1963) (discussing both
cases). For a recent decision involving an agency in which considerable statutory
construction was indulged in see Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658
(1963).
,' Commentators have asserted that the courts have too often paid homage to the
agencies for no apparent reason other than deference to uniformity and alleged
expertise. They argue that in reality these bases for invoking primary jurisdiction
have been overvalued. The supposedly expert members of agencies are sometimes
political appointees, often industry oriented, and always overburdened. Also, uni-
formity is a desirable effect, but it should not be an end in itself. The proper goal
is the achievement of the congressional purpose. See generally Convisser, supra note
2, at 328-30, 336-37; Hector, supra note 37; Jaffe, supra note 2, at 577-81, 603-04;
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 271-75.
"The proper goal would appear to be the fulfillment of the congressional purpose
with an eye toward speedy solution of antitrust cases. This, of course, will call for a
careful delineation of the purposes and the functions of the courts and the agencies.
"[W]hat is required is not an indiscriminate but a selective application of the rule
[of primary jurisdiction], attainable only by the test of legislative intent." Convisser,
supra note 2, at 337. (Emphasis added.) See generally FULDA §§ 13.5-.6, and Latta,
supra note 2, at 294-95 (both argue for a splitting of the causes where possible and
necessary). But see Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 311 (1961) (antitrust laws hinder the regulation of aviation industry by the
CAB).
* After this note had gone to press, the CAB issued a statement which reveals the
CAB's interpretation of the Pan American decision and indicates how the CAB intends
to utilize its newly discovered powers. On or about July 15, 1963, the CAB announced
that a proceeding would be held to hear a proposal by Pan American that it be
allowed to purchase Grace's interest in Panagra. The same announcement noted the
Board's tentative rejection of the Pan American proposal and stated that it would be
in the public interest for Pan American and Grace to sell their interests in Panagra
to Braniff Airlines, which competes with Panagra in South America. See N. Y. Times,
July 18, 1963, p. 42, col. 4; 371 U.S. at 314-19. The CAB asserted that such a voluntary
sale would "avoid the expensive litigation which will otherwise be necessary to com-
plete the investigation." N. Y. Times, July 19, 1963, p. 32, col. 4. Pan American, of
course, rejected the CAB's suggestion. Ibid. Although the premature "shotgun mar-
riage" declaration of the Board is disturbing, for the purposes of this note attention
can more profitably be focused on the form and scope of the investigation the CAB
intends to make.
The CAB stated that on authority of the Pan American case it would investigate
whether Pan American or Grace (or both) had violated the Federal Aviation Act
[Vol. 1963: 743
Vol. 1963: 743] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 753
either through the original agreements or in the management of Panagra. See N. Y.
Times, July 18, 1963, p. 42, col. 4. Thus, the CAB obviously reasons that the Pan
American decision has endowed it with jurisdiction over -Grace. See note 27 supra.
Also, by investigating the original agreements, the CAB will be scrutinizing pre-1938
activities and transactions. See notes 19 & 21 supra and accompanying text. The Board
further stated that it would consider whether Pan American or Grace -(or both) should
be required to divest their holding in Panagra if either (or both) had engaged in
unfair competitive practices. See notes 20, 22 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
Although the CAB has not in fact rendered a decision, the statement discussed
above leaves little doubt as to the outcome of the proceeding. By forcing Pan Ameri-
can and Grace to sell Panagra to Braniff, the Board will to a large degree effectuate
the type of monopoly it was supposedly trying to prevent when it urged the Justice
Department to bring suit in the Pan American case. See note 13 supra. While the
CAB has correctly estimated its powers under the Pan American case (jurisdiction over
Grace, jurisdiction over pre-1938 transactions, and power of divestiture), it has appar-
ently neglected to take cognizance of the underlying holding of the opinion: the
principles of competition are to play an important role in regulating the aviation
industry in accordance with the articulated congressional policy.
